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بررسی تطبیقی الگوهای مدیریت بحران کووید در چین، کرهجنوبی و ایران | ||
| مدیریت سیاسی | ||
| دوره 1، شماره 1، شهریور 1405، صفحه 53-76 اصل مقاله (707.3 K) | ||
| نوع مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی | ||
| نویسندگان | ||
| سمانه موحدی* 1؛ سعیده شمس2 | ||
| 1دانشجوی دکتری روابط بین الملل دانشگاه علامه طباطبائی، تهران، ایران. | ||
| 2دکتری مطالعات منطقه ای دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران. | ||
| چکیده | ||
| با همهگیری ویروس کرونا و سرعت شیوع آن بسیاری از کشورهای جهان غافلگیر شده و بلافاصله وضعیت اضطراری بحرانی اعلام کرده، شروع به انجام اقداماتی به منظور مبارزه با این ویروس و مهار آن کردند. برخی از کشورها مانند چین در مقابله با این ویروس موفق به مهار نسبی آن شده و برخی دیگر علیرغم الگو قرار دادن شیوه مدیریتی کشورهای موفق در عمل قادر به مهار کرونا نبودند. نکته مهم این است که متغیرهایی مانند نوع رژیم سیاسی و ساختار حکومت نیز لزوماً ارتباط مستقیم و تعیین کنندهای با نحوه واکنش کشورها به این بحران نداشته است. هم کشورهای دموکراتیک و هم اقتدارگرا تقریباً واکنش یکسانی داشتهاند. پژوهش حاضر مدیریت بحران کرونا در کشورهای چین و کره جنوبی به عنوان نمایندگان کشورهای اقتدارگرا و دموکراتیک و همچنین جمهوری اسلامی ایران را مورد مطالعه تطبیقی قرار داده است. در این راستا سؤال این است که چرا علیرغم نحوه واکنش تقریباً یکسان کشورهای مختلف به بحران کرونا، برخی مانند چین و کره جنوبی با ساختارهای حکومتی متفاوت موفق و برخی مانند ایران ناموفق بودهاند؟ بهنظر میرسد قطع نظر از نوع رژیم و ساختار سیاسی در کشورهای مختلف، برای مدیریت بحران باید متغیرهای فوریت، قاطعیت و انسجام سازمانی تحت نظر مرکزی واحد در مراحل مختلف بحران وجود داشته باشد. این متغیرها در صورتی که همراه با متغیر سرمایه اجتماعی باشد منجر به موفقیت در مهار بحران کرونا میشود. تجربه کشورهای موفق مانند چین و کره جنوبی این موارد را تأیید میکند. روش پژوهش حاضر توصیفی-تطبیقی است. | ||
| کلیدواژهها | ||
| مدیریت بحران؛ ویروس کرونا؛ سرمایه اجتماعی؛ چین؛ کرهجنوبی و جمهوری اسلامی ایران | ||
| عنوان مقاله [English] | ||
| A comparative study of Covid crisis management models in China, South Korea, and Iran | ||
| نویسندگان [English] | ||
| Samaneh Movahedi1؛ Saiede Shams2 | ||
| 1PhD student, Department of International Relations, Allameh Tabataba'i University, Tehran, Iran. | ||
| 2PhD, Department of Regional Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran. | ||
| چکیده [English] | ||
| The global outbreak of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) confronted the international community with one of the most acute epidemiological, economic, and institutional crises in modern history. The sheer speed and virulence with which the pathogen proliferated caught governments across the globe unprepared, forcing them to declare national states of emergency and implement sweeping, unprecedented containment protocols. However, the trajectory of crisis responses varied widely among nations. Certain states, such as China, managed to achieve rapid and relative containment of transmission vectors, whereas others struggled continuously. Even when implementing public health blueprints and non-pharmaceutical interventions modeled directly after successful examples, several states encountered severe bottlenecks in practical execution. Crucially, empirical observation reveals that traditional structural variables—most notably regime type and broad classifications of democratic versus authoritarian governance—did not exhibit a deterministic or linear relationship with pandemic mitigation performance. Both open democracies and closed authoritarian systems exhibited wide variance within their own peer groups, often deploying surprisingly similar containment toolkits, ranging from quarantine and localized lock-downs to contact tracing and movement restrictions. The operational disparity observed in the global landscape indicates that institutional labels alone cannot account for crisis management success or failure. To rigorously interrogate this phenomenon, the present study conducts a descriptive-comparative analysis of crisis management dynamics across three distinct political landscapes: the People’s Republic of China, representing an authoritarian governance framework; the Republic of Korea (South Korea), representing an established democratic framework; and the Islamic Republic of Iran, representing a unique governance structure confronting multifaceted internal and external pressures. In light of these empirical cases, the core research question emerges: Why, despite employing seemingly comparable containment measures and non-pharmaceutical protocols, were states with fundamentally different political structures such as China and South Korea able to mount effective crisis containment, while the Islamic Republic of Iran faced protracted domestic management challenges? The central hypothesis advanced in this research posited that effective crisis governance is not primarily dictated by formal constitutional architecture or abstract democratic legitimacy, but rather by the presence and synchronization of specific operational and sociological variables. At the institutional level, successful crisis containment requires an acute sense of temporal urgency, executive decisiveness, and deep organizational cohesion orchestrated by a unified, centralized coordination body across all distinct phases of the emergency. When high-velocity administrative mobilization is achieved under the auspices of a single operational command, the state minimizes jurisdictional fragmentation, prevents contradictory public directives, and streamlines bureaucratic friction. However, organizational efficiency within the state machinery remains insufficient if it operates in a social vacuum. These administrative capacities must be fundamentally underpinned by social capital. Social capital—operationalized here through horizontal interpersonal trust, compliance norms, and, most importantly, vertical institutional trust between the state and civic society—serves as the critical transmission belt translating official decrees into collective societal compliance. Without a baseline of public confidence and civic solidarity, top-down directives invariably generate friction, skepticism, and behavioral non-compliance. The empirical records of China and South Korea validate this critical synergy, albeit through distinct institutional pathways. In China, institutional centralization and executive decisiveness enabled rapid vertical mobilization; simultaneously, social capital manifested through community-level networks, civic discipline, and widespread compliance with stringent protocols. South Korea, conversely, mobilized robust democratic institutional cohesion through rapid executive action, scientific transparency, and centralized coordination. This fostered high levels of public trust, leading to voluntary civic adherence to aggressive contact tracing and testing regimens without the imposition of draconian physical containment. Both models, while situated at opposite ends of the political spectrum, successfully aligned administrative decisiveness with strong vertical social capital. Conversely, the crisis trajectory in the Islamic Republic of Iran illustrated the vulnerabilities that arise when these essential conditions are fragmented. Early hesitation compromised operational urgency, while divergent viewpoints among administrative bodies impeded organizational cohesion. Crucially, existing socio-economic pressures and previous governance frictions contributed to deficits in institutional trust, limiting the effectiveness of the state’s communication and diminishing public compliance with containment directives. In conclusion, utilizing a descriptive-comparative research methodology, this study demonstrates that crisis resilience hinges on the dynamic interplay between unified administrative decisiveness and social capital. By dissecting the experiences of China, South Korea, and Iran, this analysis moves beyond simplistic regime-type typologies, offering a more nuanced framework for understanding institutional readiness and societal resilience in the face of transnational epidemiological shocks. | ||
| کلیدواژهها [English] | ||
| Crisis Management, Coronavirus, Social Capital, China, South Korea, and the Islamic Republic of Iran | ||
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